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Abstract 
The mere exposure effect refers to the well-established finding that people evaluate a stimulus 
more positively after repeated exposure to that stimulus. We investigated whether a change in 
stimulus evaluation can occur also when participants are not repeatedly exposed to a stimulus, 
but are merely instructed that one stimulus will occur frequently and another stimulus will 
occur infrequently. We report seven experiments showing that (1) mere exposure instructions 
influence implicit stimulus evaluations as measured with an Implicit Association Test, 
personalized Implicit Association Test, or Affect Misattribution Procedure, but not with an 
Evaluative Priming Task, (2) mere exposure instructions influence explicit evaluations, and 
(3) the instruction effect depends on participants’ memory of which stimulus will be presented 
more frequently. We discuss how these findings inform us about the boundary conditions of 
mere exposure instruction effects, as well as the mental processes that underlie mere exposure 
and mere exposure instruction effects.  
Keywords: mere exposure, instructions, implicit evaluation, IAT, evaluative priming  
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The Mere Exposure Instruction Effect:  
Mere Exposure Instructions Influence Liking 
It has been recognized for several decades that many aspects of a person’s behavior are 
determined largely by his or her likes and dislikes (Allport, 1935). Accordingly, understanding 
how preferences are formed and how they can be influenced is an important aim of 
psychological science. Research has shown that preferences can form as a result of direct 
experiences with a stimulus. These direct experiences typically involve regularities with 
regard to (a) the mere presence of the stimulus, (b) stimuli that are paired with the stimulus, or 
(c) actions that are paired with the stimulus (De Houwer, 2007, 2009a). With regard to (a), 
research on the mere exposure (ME) effect has shown that frequent exposure to a particular 
stimulus can lead to a more positive evaluation of that stimulus. This effect was reported early 
on in the history of psychology (Fechner, 1876; Maslow, 1937), and has received widespread 
attention since the pivotal publication of Zajonc (1968). A meta-analysis of 208 independent 
experiments established the ME effect as a reliable effect with a mean effect size of d = 0.56 
(Bornstein, 1989). With regard to (b), evaluative conditioning (EC) research revealed that the 
evaluation of a stimulus can be influenced by pairing that stimulus with positive or negative 
stimuli (see Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010, for a review). With 
regard to (c), studies have shown that the repeated performance of positively valenced actions 
such as approach movements or negatively valenced actions such as avoidance movements in 
response to a stimulus can lead to more positive or negative stimulus evaluations, respectively 
(Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007; Woud, Maas, Becker, & Rinck, 2013).  
Recent studies have established that some of these effects can occur also on the basis 
of mere instructions. In studies on instruction-based EC, it has been shown that changes in 
stimulus evaluations can arise when participants are informed about future stimulus pairings. 
For instance, De Houwer (2006) told participants that they would perform an experiment in 
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which one novel stimulus (e.g., the letter string UDIBNON) would be paired with positive 
pictures and another novel stimulus (e.g., BAYRAM) would be paired with negative pictures. 
Despite the fact that participants never actually experienced the stimulus pairings, participants 
exhibited a preference for the former stimulus over the latter. Likewise, a recent study found 
effects similar to those of approach-avoidance training when participants did not actually 
perform approach-avoidance actions but were merely instructed that they would later have to 
perform these actions (Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2015). For instance, 
participants who received instructions to approach one fictitious social group (e.g., Niffites) 
and avoid another fictitious social group (e.g., Luupites) showed a preference for the former 
group. These instruction-based effects were found to critically depend on participants’ 
memory of the instructions such that only participants who correctly remembered the 
instructions showed these effects. 
In accordance with experience-based procedures, it has been demonstrated that EC 
instructions and approach-avoidance instructions can influence not only explicit (i.e., non-
automatic) but also implicit (i.e., automatic) stimulus evaluations (Gast & De Houwer, 2012; 
Van Dessel et al., 2015). These changes in implicit evaluations are not fully mediated by 
changes in explicit evaluations (Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, Smith, & De Schryver, 2016). 
The latter finding is important because it argues against an explanation of instruction effects 
in terms of mere demand compliance. Moreover, it challenges important models of implicit 
evaluation which assume that propositional information influences implicit evaluations only if 
this information is considered a valid basis for evaluation and, hence, is incorporated in 
explicit evaluations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; see Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, et 
al., 2016, for a discussion). 
 The aim of the present study is to investigate whether changes in liking can also occur 
on the basis of ME instructions. This may seem implausible because the ME effect is often 
THE MERE EXPOSURE INSTRUCTION EFFECT  5 
thought to result from mental processes that occur automatically when participants repeatedly 
experience stimulus presentations (Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992; 
Topolinski, 2012). In line with this idea, some studies have provided evidence that the ME 
effect does not even require conscious recollection of the presentations of the stimuli (e.g., 
Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Monahan, Murphy, & Zajonc, 
2000). However, there are important reasons to believe that ME effects might (also) depend 
on processes that involve the conscious acquisition of propositional information. First, recent 
studies challenged the idea that ME effects are independent of stimulus awareness. In these 
studies, the ME effect occurred only when participants were aware that certain stimuli had 
been presented more often than others (Brooks & Watkins, 1989; de Zilva, Vu, Newell, & 
Pearson, 2013; Newell & Shanks, 2007; Stafford & Grimes, 2012). Second, Wang and Chang 
(2004) provided evidence that even the direction of the ME effect strongly depends on 
memory of stimulus presentations. They found that participants exhibited more positive 
evaluations of new stimuli that were judged to be old than of old stimuli that were judged to 
be new. These findings suggests that a person’s propositional beliefs about the number of 
times stimuli are presented might be more important for the occurrence of a ME effect than 
the actual stimulus presentations. 
In the current study, we adapted the instruction-based EC procedure of De Houwer 
(2006) in such a way that participants received instructions about a later phase in which they 
would encounter two novel words. One of the words would occur frequently and the other 
word would occur infrequently. After participants received these ME instructions, they were 
informed that they would first complete another task. This task was an implicit evaluation task 
that registered participants’ implicit evaluations of the two words. We used this experimental 
set-up to test for ME instruction effects in three lab-based experiments and in four highly 
powered internet-based studies (see Zhou & Fishbach, 2016, for reasons why it can be 
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important to establish new effects independently in both lab-based and internet-based studies). 
Note that our studies tested whether participants would show a preference for the instructed 
frequent word over the instructed infrequent word. This is different from ME studies in which 
the evaluation of a frequently presented stimulus is compared to the evaluation of a novel (i.e., 
never exposed) stimulus. We included an instructed infrequent word in our comparison to 
allow examination of the effect of instructions while keeping the number of exposures to the 
stimuli constant. 
Although the main aim of this study was to examine whether ME instructions can 
influence stimulus evaluations, we also looked at two potential boundary conditions of these 
effects. First, we examined whether effects depend on the task that is used to measure 
evaluations. More specifically, across the different experiments, we used multiple tasks to 
measure implicit evaluations (Implicit Association Test, IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998, Experiments 1 and 4; personalized IAT, pIAT, Olson & Fazio, 2004, 
Experiment 2; Evaluative Priming Task, EPT, Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986, 
Experiments 3, 5, and 6; Affect Misattribution Procedure, AMP, Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & 
Stewart, 2005, Experiment 7), as well as a measure of explicit evaluation (explicit rating task, 
Experiments 4-7). Each of the four implicit evaluation measures are sensitive to a number of 
factors other than the to-be-measured psychological construct of implicit evaluation (De 
Houwer, 2003; Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014). As a result, previous studies have found that 
effects do not necessarily converge on these measures. We included the IAT, EPT, and AMP 
because these are currently the most widely used implicit evaluation measures. These three 
measures differ in important ways (that might give rise to differences in observed effects). 
First, in the EPT and AMP, participants categorize target stimuli (i.e., valenced words or 
Chinese ideographs) as positive or negative. The evaluation stimuli (e.g., fevkani and lokanta) 
are included as primes that precede the presentation of the target stimuli and that might 
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influence categorization responses. In contrast, in the IAT, participants perform two binary 
categorizations (i.e., the categorization of valenced words as positive or negative and the 
categorization of the evaluation stimuli on the basis of their identity). Because these 
categorizations are performed using the same response key, the (unintended) categorization of 
evaluation stimuli as positive or negative might influence task performance. It is therefore 
often assumed that IAT effects are based on fundamentally different processes than EPT and 
AMP effects (e.g., Payne & Gawronski, 2010). Second, whereas implicit evaluation scores in 
the IAT and EPT are calculated on the basis of response latencies, AMP scores are calculated 
on the basis of the number of positive and negative categorization responses. In addition to 
these three widely used implicit evaluation measures we also included the pIAT. This measure 
is assumed to minimize the impact of extra-personal knowledge in the IAT (Olson & Fazio, 
2004), which is important because our aim was to measure personal liking of the stimuli. An 
overview of the most important procedural differences between the implicit evaluation 
measures is presented in Table 1. 
Second, in Experiments 4-7 we also investigated whether ME instruction effects 
depend on participants’ memory for the instructions. Based on the fact that effects of EC 
instructions and approach-avoidance instructions also critically depend on memory for the 
instructions, we expected that ME instructions would have a stronger influence on stimulus 
evaluations when participants have accurate memory of the instructions. If the acquisition of 
propositional information about the frequent or infrequent occurrence of a stimulus causes 
changes in participants’ implicit stimulus evaluations, then this should depend on the extent to 
which participants register this information, which should be reflected in memory for the 
instructions. To gain information about the strength of evidence for the presence or absence of 
ME effects for participants who did or did not remember the instructions correctly, we 
supplemented traditional t-test analyses with Bayesian analyses. Bayesian analyses were 
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performed with Cauchy prior width = .707, according to the procedures outlined by Rouder, 
Speckman, Sun, Morey, and Iverson (2009). They provide a Bayes Factor that gives an 
indication of how strongly the data support either the null hypothesis (BF0; reflecting the 
absence of a significant effect) or the alternative hypothesis (BF1; reflecting the presence of a 
significant effect). BFs between 1 and 3, between 3 and 10, and larger than 10, respectively 
designate ‘anecdotal evidence’, ‘substantial evidence’, and ‘strong evidence’ for either the 
null (BF0) or the alternative hypothesis (BF1) (Jeffreys, 1961).  
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 
Method 
Participants. A total of 40 (33 women), 98 (67 women), and 39 (32 women) Dutch-
speaking undergraduates participated in exchange for 4 euros in Experiments 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants were not 
given any information about the purpose of the experiment. 
Apparatus and Materials. Two nonwords were used as evaluation stimuli, namely 
‘LOKANTA’ and ‘FEVKANI’. These stimuli are often used in studies examining changes in 
(implicit) evaluations (e.g., Van Dessel, De Houwer, Roets, & Gast, 2016), including the 
seminal mere exposure studies of Zajonc (1968). Experiments were programmed and 
presented using the INQUISIT Millisecond Software package (Inquisit 3.0, 2011) on a Tori 
desktop PC with a 19-inch monitor. 
Procedure. After participants had given informed consent, they were seated in front of 
the computer screen. Half of the participants read the following instructions (translated from 
Dutch): 
In the following experiment you will see two words: The word LOKANTA will be 
presented often and the word FEVKANI will be presented rarely. It is very important 
that you remember this rule. You will need this information to complete the task 
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correctly. Before we present these words to you, you will complete a categorization 
task. This will take about 5 minutes of your time. Make sure that you do not forget how 
often you will see each word in the part of the study that follows the categorization task. 
Remember: The word LOKANTA will be presented often and the word FEVKANI will 
be presented rarely. Please press 'Continue' only when you are sure that you remember 
the instructions and are ready to begin the categorization task. Once you finish reading 
these instructions, this information will not be repeated! 
The other participants received identical instructions except that they were told that 
FEVKANI would be presented often (instructed frequent word) and LOKANTA would be 
presented rarely (instructed infrequent word). Whether the instructions presented the 
information about the instructed frequent word first and the information about the instructed 
infrequent word second, or vice versa, was counterbalanced across participants. After 
participants read the instructions, they could proceed to the next screen where the instructions 
for the implicit evaluation task were presented. 
In the IAT of Experiment 1, participants categorized eight attribute words as ‘Positive’ 
(the Dutch words for HAPPY, HONEST, LOVE, and PEACE) or ‘Negative’ (the Dutch words 
for DEATH, SLIME, CANCER, and UGLY) and target words FEVKANI and LOKANTA as 
‘Fevkani’ or ‘Lokanta’, by pressing a left (Q) or right (M) key on an AZERTY computer 
keyboard. All words were presented in uppercase letters in Arial Black font with font size 36. 
Participants began the IAT with 24 practice trials sorting the positive and negative attribute 
words and 20 practice trials sorting the target words. Next, participants completed two blocks 
of 48 trials in which FEVKANI and positive stimuli shared a single response key and 
LOKANTA and negative stimuli shared another response key (half of the participants 
completed the IAT in this way, whereas the other participants began by sorting LOKANTA 
and positive with the same key). IAT block order was orthogonally crossed with the between-
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subjects factor of instructed frequent word. Participants then practiced sorting target words 
with the response key assignment reversed for 24 trials and finally participants completed 2 
blocks of 48 trials in which LOKANTA shared a response key with positive words and 
FEVKANI shared a response key with negative words (or vice versa). The order of the trials 
was determined randomly for each block and each participant separately. On each trial, a 
word was presented in the center of the screen until the participant pressed one of the two 
valid keys. If the response was correct, the word disappeared and the next word was presented 
400 ms later. If the response was incorrect, the word was replaced by a red “X” for 400 ms. 
The next word appeared 400 ms after the red “X” was removed from the screen. 
The pIAT of Experiment 2 was identical to the IAT used in Experiment 1 with two 
exceptions. First, the category labels ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ were changed to “I like” and “I 
dislike”. Second, no error feedback was presented during the task (Olson & Fazio, 2004).  
In the EPT of Experiment 3, participants categorized target words as either positive or 
negative using a left (A) and right (P) key on an AZERTY computer keyboard. In line with 
standard procedures (Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007), a single trial consisted of 
the presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms, a blank screen for 500 ms, a prime for 200 ms, 
a post-prime interval for 50 ms and the presentation of a target word for a maximum of 1500 
ms. The inter-trial interval was set to vary randomly between 500 ms and 1500 ms. Whenever 
an incorrect response was made or participants did not respond prior to offset of the target 
stimulus, a red X was displayed in the center of the screen for 1000 ms before the next trial 
started. Participants were asked to respond as quickly as possible without making too many 
errors. Targets consisted of 10 positive words (e.g., the Dutch words for Love, Pleasure, 
Smile) and 10 negative words (e.g., the Dutch words for Hate, Pain, Sadness). The words 
FEVKANI and LOKANTA were used as prime stimuli. There were four different types of 
trials: trials with each of the two words as prime and a positive or negative word as target. 
THE MERE EXPOSURE INSTRUCTION EFFECT  11 
Participants first completed 15 practice trials and then completed 180 trials separated into 
three blocks of 60 trials, each containing 15 of the four types of trials, presented in random 
order.  
Next, we assessed whether participants had correctly remembered the ME instructions. 
They were asked two questions: (1) “According to the instructions, how often will the word 
LOKANTA be presented?”, and (2) “According to the instructions, how often will the word 
FEVKANI be presented?”. Participants indicated their answer by selecting an option from a 
dropdown list (often/rarely/I don’t remember). The order in which the questions were 
presented was determined randomly for each participant. 
Finally, even though performance on this task was irrelevant for our hypotheses, 
participants performed 11 trials of a ME task in which they saw presentations of the frequent 
and infrequent instructed words. Participants were told that they would see a number of non-
existing words presented on the screen and that they would not have to react to these words, 
but only to attentively watch the presentations. Each trial consisted of the presentation of the 
word FEVKANI or LOKANTA which remained on the screen for 1000 ms. The inter-trial 
interval was 1000 ms. The instructed frequent word was presented on nine occasions whereas 
the instructed infrequent word was presented on two occasions. This task was only included in 
order not to deceive participants in the earlier instructions and did not involve any measure of 
liking of the word stimuli. 
Results 
Data-preparation. In line with previous studies on the impact of instructions on 
stimulus evaluations (e.g., Van Dessel et al., 2015), we excluded the data of 12 (30%, 
Experiment 1), 29 (30%, Experiment 2), and 3 participants (8%, Experiment 3) because they 
did not correctly answer the memory questions. Including the data from all participants in the 
analyses reduced the magnitude of the instruction effects but did not change the statistical 
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significance of any of the reported effects. We explored the role of memory for the 
instructions in ME instruction effects in Experiments 4-7, which were better suited to answer 
this question because they had higher statistical power. High statistical power is especially 
important for this question because the reliability of the necessary statistical tests depends on 
whether there are sufficient participants with different levels of memory for the instructions. 
In Experiments 1 and 2, IAT and pIAT scores were calculated using the D4-algorithm 
(Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), such that higher scores indicate a stronger preference 
for the frequent instructed word. Spearman-Brown corrected split-half reliability of the IAT 
and pIAT scores, calculated on the basis of an odd-even split, was r(26) = .62 (Experiment 1), 
and r(67) = .80 (Experiment 2).
 1
 
In Experiment 3, data of EPT trials with an incorrect response were discarded (6.9%). 
In line with standard procedures at our lab (e.g., Spruyt, De Houwer, & Hermans, 2009), the 
impact of outliers was reduced by excluding trials with a response latency that deviated more 
than 2.5 standard deviations from an individual’s mean latency for trials with the same prime 
and the same type of target (i.e., Lokanta-positive, Lokanta-negative, Fevkani-positive or 
Fevkani-negative trials; this resulted in an overall exclusion of 2.4% of the trials). EPT scores 
were created by (a) subtracting the mean latencies on trials with a positive target and the 
frequent instructed word prime from the mean latencies on trials with a negative target and the 
frequent instructed word prime, (b) subtracting the mean latencies on trials with a positive 
target and the infrequent instructed word prime from the mean latencies on trials with a 
negative target and the infrequent instructed word prime, and (c) subtracting the second 
difference score from the first difference score. Higher EPT scores indicate a stronger 
                                                 
1
 We analyzed IAT scores that were calculated using the D4 algorithm because these scores are most often used 
and are shown to bring improvement over other scores (e.g., they have better internal consistency, see Greenwald 
et al., 2003). For the sake of completeness, we also performed analyses on mean reaction times. Results of these 
analyses supported the reported conclusions and are reported in Electronic Supplementary Material 1. 
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preference for the frequent instructed word. Spearman-Brown corrected split-half reliability of 
the EPT score, calculated on the basis of an odd-even split, was r(34) = .28. 
Data-analyses. We performed one-sample t-tests to examine whether participants’ 
implicit evaluation scores in the three experiments were significantly larger than zero, 
indicating that participants preferred the instructed frequent word over the instructed 
infrequent word. We observed a significant effect of the ME instructions on IAT scores in 
Experiment 1 (M = 0.23, SD = 0.42), t(27) = 2.84, p = .008, dz = 0.54, 95% confidence 
interval (CI) = [0.06, 0.39], BF1 = 5.32, and on pIAT scores in Experiment 2 (M = 0.16, SD = 
0.48), t(68) = 2.72, p = .008, dz = 0.33, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.27], BF1 = 3.91. We did not observe 
a significant ME instruction effect on EPT scores in Experiment 3 (M = -3.34, SD = 46.15), 
t(35) = -0.43, p = .67, dz = -0.07, 95% CI = [-18.96, 12.28], BF0 = 5.06 (Table 2). 
Discussion 
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that merely instructing participants that certain non-
existing words would occur frequently or infrequently in a future task leads to more positive 
implicit evaluations of the instructed frequent word than of the instructed infrequent word. 
This effect is in line with typical ME effects, but it occurred even though participants were 
exposed to the stimuli only after their evaluations were probed. Hence, our results 
demonstrate a change in liking that is based only on instructions about stimulus frequency. 
Results also revealed an important boundary condition of ME instruction effects. In 
Experiment 3, we did not observe a ME instruction effect on implicit evaluations as measured 
with an EPT. A number of explanations can be put forward for this result. First, ME 
instructions might influence IAT performance but not the actual (implicit) liking of the 
stimulus. For instance, Olson and Fazio (2004) proposed that IAT performance might not 
capture personal preferences but rather extra-personal knowledge (i.e., knowledge that a 
person has about societal views but regards as irrelevant for his or her own feelings about the 
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attitude object). Participants might use this knowledge to improve their performance on the 
IAT, such that IAT scores reflect this knowledge rather than personal liking of the stimuli. 
However, this explanation is incompatible with the fact that we did observe a ME instruction 
effect on the pIAT which is specifically designed to minimize the impact of extra-personal 
knowledge. Another possibility is that both IAT and pIAT performance might be influenced by 
other non-attitudinal factors such as participants’ recoding of IAT categories (Rothermund, 
Teige-Mocigemba, Gast, & Wentura, 2009). For instance, IAT categories might be recoded on 
the basis of asymmetries in the salience of IAT categories and this might facilitate IAT 
performance on certain blocks, producing IAT effects (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). 
Importantly, processes that involve voluntary control may also contribute strongly to IAT 
performance (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005), especially with novel stimuli (De Houwer, Beckers, 
& Moors, 2007). For instance, participants might consciously slow down responses in 
compatible or incompatible blocks, thereby influencing IAT effects. Thus, it is possible that 
ME instruction effects on the IAT reflect controlled changes in evaluation which are not 
registered with the EPT. 
Second, the fact that we did not observe an effect on EPT scores may be due to a lack 
of power in this experiment. Indeed, a power analysis revealed that the power for revealing a 
small effect was very low (i.e., power = 0.32 for an effect size of dz = 0.20). In combination 
with the fact that (1) we do not yet know whether ME instruction effects on implicit 
evaluation are typically of small or medium size and (2) evaluative priming procedures 
typically produce relatively small effect sizes and scores that are relatively low in reliability 
(Wittenbrink, 2007), it is therefore possible that the null effect observed in Experiment 3 
constitutes a Type II error. Note, however, that the Bayes Factor indicated substantial 
evidence for the null hypothesis (reflecting the absence of a significant effect). 
Experiments 4, 5, 6 and 7 
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In order to obtain more power for establishing whether ME instructions can cause 
changes in stimulus evaluations, we conducted four additional internet-based experiments that 
involved a large number of participants. We also investigated whether ME instruction effects 
are restricted to IAT-based implicit measures. More specifically, we examined effects of ME 
instructions on implicit evaluations as measured with either an IAT (Experiment 4), two 
different versions of an EPT (Experiments 5 and 6), and an AMP (Experiment 7). The 
addition of the AMP is important because this measure is based on a priming procedure (and 
thus fundamentally different from the IAT; see Gawronski & Ye, 2014) but is also known to 
result in more reliable effects than the EPT (e.g., Payne et al., 2005). Additionally, we 
examined whether ME instructions also influence explicit evaluations as measured with an 
explicit rating task (Experiments 4-7).  
These experiments were also designed to investigate whether ME instruction effects 
depend on participants’ memory of the instructions. Because an answer to this question 
requires sufficient statistical power (e.g., to detect a small effect size of dz = 0.20 with 
sufficient power [power = 0.80] approximately 156 participants are needed in each memory 
condition), we decided to include a minimum of 700 participants in each of the experiments. 
Because we especially wanted sufficient statistical power in Experiments 5 and 6 that tested 
effects of ME instructions on EPT scores, we decided to include approximately 900 and 1200 
participants in those studies. We were able to recruit this high number of participants by 
implementing our study on the Project Implicit research website (https://implicit.harvard.edu). 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 716 (Experiment 4), 898 (Experiment 5), 1259 
(Experiment 6), and 724 (Experiment 7) visitors to the Project Implicit research website. 
Participation was restricted to United States citizens. In line with standard procedures of data-
reduction for Project Implicit data (e.g., Smith, De Houwer, & Nosek, 2013), we excluded the 
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data from participants who (1) did not complete all tasks (77 participants in Experiment 4: 
10.75%; 116 participants in Experiment 5: 12.92%; 128 participants in Experiment 6: 
10.17%; 120 participants in Experiment 7: 16.57%), (2) had error rates above 30% when 
considering all critical IAT test blocks or above 40% for any one of these blocks (10 
participants in Experiment 4, 1.56%), (3) had error rates in the EPT that exceeded the 
population mean by more than 2.5 standard deviations (23 participants in Experiment 5: 
2.94%, population mean = 7.23%, SD = 10.70%; 22 participants in Experiment 6: 1.95%, 
population mean = 4.29%, SD = 6.64%), or (4) responded either “positive” or “negative” to 
all AMP trials in any of the AMP blocks (55 participants in Experiment 7: 9.11%). The 
analyses were performed on the data of 629 participants (420 women, mean age = 35, SD = 
14) in Experiment 4, 759 participants (446 women, mean age = 32, SD = 13) in Experiment 5, 
1109 participants (676 women, mean age = 31, SD = 13) in Experiment 6, and 550 
participants (326 women, mean age = 30, SD = 13) in Experiment 7. 
Procedure. The procedure of Experiments 4-7 was identical to Experiments 1-3 (e.g., 
they involved the same evaluation stimuli and ME instructions) with the following exceptions. 
First, the IAT procedure of Experiment 4 differed from Experiment 1 in three ways. A first 
change involved the stimuli that were used in the IAT. Attribute stimuli consisted of ten 
positive words (e.g., Glorious, Success, Wonderful, Marvellous) and ten negative words (e.g., 
Agony, Unpleasant, Evil, Failure). Target words were FEVKANI and LOKANTA presented 
in eight different combinations of font types (Arial Black and Fixedsys), capitalizations 
(uppercase and lowercase), and size (16pt and 18pt), resulting in 8 different stimuli (for a 
similar procedure see Zanon, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2014). This was done to avoid the 
possibility that target stimuli would be classified only on the basis of simple perceptual 
features. A second adaptation was that, in line with standard IAT procedures on the Project 
Implicit website, participants who made an error categorizing the stimuli saw a red “X” on the 
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screen and had to correct their mistake in order to continue. Latencies were recorded until a 
correct response was made. A third adaptation was that participants now used the E and I keys 
of their computer keyboard to categorize the stimuli in the IAT. 
Second, the EPT of Experiment 5 consisted of 120 instead of the 180 trials of 
Experiment 2, in accordance with previous studies on the Project Implicit website that used 
the EPT (van Dessel et al., 2015). Trials were separated into three blocks of 40 trials each. 
Prime stimuli were the eight different versions of the words FEVKANI and LOKANTA that 
were used as stimuli in the IAT of Experiment 4. Target stimuli for the EPT were 14 positive 
words (e.g., Attractive, Cheer, Beautiful) and 14 negative words (e.g., Annoying, Disaster, 
Loss). These target words were categorized by using the E and I keys of the computer 
keyboard. The EPT of Experiment 6 had a similar procedure with two exceptions. First, we 
implemented no more response deadline in the EPT (as is often the case in EPT procedures: 
e.g., Storbeck & Robinson, 2004). Second, the EPT consisted of only one block of 80 trials. 
This adaptation was made to counter the possibility that the ME instruction effect on the EPT 
might dissipate over time.  
Third, in Experiment 7, implicit evaluations were registered with an AMP. In this task 
participants gave liking ratings for Chinese pictographs. Importantly, presentation of each 
pictograph was preceded by the presentation of a prime stimulus which consisted of the 
frequent instructed or infrequent instructed word. Participants were instructed to ignore the 
initial stimulus and rate whether the pictograph was either more pleasant or less pleasant than 
average. There were three different types of trials: trials in which the word FEVKANI, the 
word LOKANTA, or a grey rectangle served as prime. An individual trial began with the 
presentation of the prime for 100 ms. This was followed by a blank screen for 100 ms after 
which one of 72 different Chinese pictographs was presented for 100 ms. Finally, a mask 
image was presented (a black and white image) until the participant made a response by using 
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the E or I key of their computer keyboard. Participants first completed three practice trials 
(with grey rectangle primes) and then completed 180 trials separated into three blocks of 60 
trials, each containing 20 of each type of trial, presented in random order.  
Finally, after the implicit evaluation task and before the memory questions and the ME 
task that ended the experiment, participants rated their liking of each of the words by 
answering two questions: “To what extent do you like FEVKANI?” and “To what extent do 
you like LOKANTA?”. Participants gave their evaluative ratings by selecting an option on a 
9-point Likert scale (1= not liked at all; 9 = completely liked). The order of the two explicit 
evaluation questions was counterbalanced. 
Results 
Data-preparation. In Experiment 4, the IAT scores were calculated using the D2-
algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003). This procedure is similar to the D4 procedure used in 
Experiment 1 but it takes into account that the IAT procedure of Experiment 4 required 
participants to correct their mistakes before moving on to the next trial, in line with the 
standard IAT procedure on the Project Implicit website at the time of testing. Spearman-
Brown corrected split-half reliability of the IAT score was r(627) = .84. In Experiments 5 and 
6, EPT trials with an incorrect response were dropped (Experiment 5: 6.74%; Experiment 6: 
3.63%) as were trials on which reaction times were at least 2.5 standard deviations removed 
from an individual’s mean for that type of trial (Experiment 5: 2.60%; Experiment 6: 2.93%). 
Spearman-Brown corrected split-half reliability of the EPT score was r(757) = .37 
(Experiment 5), and r(1126) = .34 (Experiment 6). In Experiment 7, individual AMP scores 
were calculated by subtracting the proportion of “pleasant” responses on trials with the 
infrequent instructed word as prime from the proportion of “pleasant” responses on trials with 
the frequent instructed word as prime. Spearman-Brown corrected split-half reliability of the 
AMP score was r(548) = .81. 
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In all four experiments, an explicit rating score was calculated by subtracting the 
evaluative rating for the infrequent instructed word from the evaluative rating for the frequent 
instructed word. The explicit rating score correlated significantly with implicit evaluation 
scores in Experiment 4, r(627) = .35, p < .001, Experiment 5, r(757) = .15, p < .001, and 
Experiment 7 , r(548) = .25, p < .001, but not in Experiment 6, r(1107) = .05, p = .11.  
To investigate the impact of memory for the instructions, we computed a memory 
variable on the basis of participants’ answers to the questions related to how often the 
instructed frequent and instructed infrequent word would be presented. Participants’ memory 
was coded as accurate when they selected the correct answer for both memory questions 
(Experiment 4: 459 participants, 73.93%; Experiment 5: 549 participants, 72.33%; 
Experiment 6: 731 participants, 65.92%; Experiment 7: 404 participants, 73.45%). Memory 
was coded as indiscriminate when only one of the questions was correctly answered or 
participants indicated ‘I don’t know’ for one or both of the questions (Experiment 4: 105 
participants, 16.69%; Experiment 5: 145 participants, 19.10%; Experiment 6: 247 
participants, 22.27%; Experiment 7: 97 participants, 17.64%). Memory was coded as reversed 
when participants selected the incorrect option for both memory questions (Experiment 4: 59 
participants, 9.38%; Experiment 5: 65 participants, 8.56%; Experiment 6: 131 participants, 
11.81%; Experiment 7: 49 participants, 8.91%). 
Data analysis of implicit evaluations. We subjected IAT scores in Experiment 4 to an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) that contained Memory as a between-subjects factor. The 
effect of Memory on IAT scores was significant, F(2, 626) = 5.36, p = .005. Participants 
preferred the frequent instructed word when they had accurate memory for the instructions (M 
= 0.12, SD = 0.48), t(458) = 5.42, p < .001, dz = 0.25, 95% CI = [0.08, 0.16], BF1 = 73208.54, 
and when they had indiscriminate memory for the instructions (M = 0.12, SD = 0.46), t(104) = 
2.60, p = .011, dz = 0.25, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.20], BF1 = 2.63, but not when they had reversed 
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memory for the instructions (M = -0.09, SD = 0.48), t(55) = -1.50, p = .14, dz = -0.20, 95% CI 
= [-0.22, 0.03], BF0 = 2.39 (see Table 2 for an overview). 
In Experiments 5 and 6, we did not observe an effect of Memory on EPT scores, Fs < 
0.52, ps > .59. Participants did not exhibit a significant preference for the frequent instructed 
word when they had accurate memory for the instructions in Experiment 5 (M = 4.43, SD = 
57.49), t(548) = 0.58, p = .56, dz = 0.02, 95% CI = [-3.39, 6.25], BF0 = 17.60, or in 
Experiment 6 (M = 1.98, SD = 103.59), t(730) = 0.52, p = .61, dz = 0.02, 95% CI = [-5.54, 
9.50], BF0 = 21.04. We also did not observe a significant ME instruction effect for participants 
with indiscriminate or reversed memory in Experiments 5 or 6, ts < 0.64, ps > .53, dzs < 0.05, 
BF0s > 7.10. 
We observed a significant main effect of Memory on AMP scores in Experiment 7, 
F(2, 547) = 3.89, p = .021. Participants preferred the frequent instructed word when they had 
accurate memory of the instructions (M = 0.04, SD = 0.20), t(403) = 4.01, p < .001, dz = 0.20, 
95% CI = [0.02, 0.06], BF1 = 140.61, but not when they had indiscriminate or reversed 
memory of the instructions, ts < 0.01, ps > .99, dzs < 0.01, BF0s > 4.12. 
Data analysis of explicit evaluations. We observed a significant main effect of 
Memory on explicit rating scores in Experiments 4, 5, and 6, Fs > 4.32, ps < .014, but not in 
Experiment 7, F(2, 547) = 1.29, p = .28. A significant preference for the frequent instructed 
word was observed for participants who correctly remembered the instructions in all 
experiments, ts > 2.11, ps < .037, dzs [0.09 – 0.11], BF1s [0.77 – 2.97]. Participants with 
indiscriminate memory also exhibited a significant instruction effect in Experiment 4 (M = 
0.61, SD = 2.48), t(104) = 2.52, p = .013, dz = 0.25, 95% CI = [0.13, 1.09], BF1 = 2.16, and a 
marginally significant effect in Experiment 6 (M = 0.25, SD = 2.18), t(246) = 1.78, p = .076, 
dz = 0.11, 95% CI = [-0.03, 0.52], BF0 = 2.94, but no significant effect in Experiments 5 or 7, 
ts < 0.66, ps >.51, dzs < 0.08, BF0s > 7.26. Participants with reversed memory exhibited a 
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significant contrast effect (i.e., a preference for the infrequent instructed word) in Experiment 
6 (M = -0.41, SD = 2.31), t(130) = -2.04, p = .043, dz = -0.18, 95% CI = [-0.81, -0.01], BF0 = 
1.39, a marginally significant contrast effect in Experiment 4 (M = -0.47, SD = 2.06), t(58) = -
1.77, p = .082, dz = -0.23, 95% CI = [-1.01, 0.06], BF0 = 1.64, and no significant effects in 
Experiments 5 or 7, ts < 0.60, ps > .42, dzs < 0.07, BF0s > 4.70. 
Combined analyses of Experiments 4-7. To compare the overall magnitude of the ME 
instruction effect on different implicit measures, we conducted an ANOVA on standardized 
implicit evaluation scores that included Measure (IAT, EPT, AMP) as a between-subjects 
factor. Scores were standardized by dividing the original implicit evaluation scores by their 
standard deviations. Data were included for all participants with accurate memory in the four 
experiments. The effect of Measure was significant, F(2, 2146) = 13.93, p < .001. The ME 
instruction effect was significantly smaller if participants performed the EPT than if they 
performed the IAT, t(1743) = 4.81, p < .001, BF1 = 5324.94, or the AMP, t(1682) = 3.66, p < 
.001, BF1 = 46.54. Participants who performed the IAT did not exhibit a larger instruction 
effect than participants who performed the AMP, t(567) = 0.65, p = .51, BF0 = 10.66. 
An ANOVA on standardized explicit evaluation scores in Experiments 4-7 with 
Memory and Previous Task (IAT, EPT, AMP) as between-subjects factors revealed only a 
main effect of Memory, F(2, 3038) = 7.59, p < .001. Participants preferred the frequent 
instructed word when they had accurate memory of the instructions (M = 0.10, SD = 0.98), 
t(2148) = 4.91, p < .001, dz = 0.11, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.14], BF1 = 3919.53. Participants who 
had indiscriminate memory of the instructions also exhibited a preference for the frequent 
instructed word (M = 0.12, SD = 1.03), t(593) = 2.79, p = .005, dz = 0.11, 95% CI = [0.03, 
0.20]. However, the Bayesian factor indicated that evidence for this effect was only anecdotal, 
BF1 = 2.17. Participants who had reversed memory of the instructions exhibited a significant 
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contrast effect (M = -0.13, SD = 1.08), t(303) = -2.07, p = .040, dz = -0.12, 95% CI = [-0.25, -
0.01]. The evidence for this effect, however, was also only anecdotal, BF1 = 1.03.  
Discussion 
 Experiments 4-7 provided corroborative evidence for ME instruction effects. ME 
instruction effects were not restricted to changes in IAT scores but also occurred in the AMP 
and an explicit rating task. We did not observe significant ME instruction effects on the EPT, 
even though we examined changes in EPT scores in two independent studies, with two 
different EPT procedures, and had sufficient power (power > .80) to detect even a small effect 
size of dz = 0.08.
2
 
Although we did not observe that ME instructions influence implicit evaluations as 
measured with an EPT, the fact that we did find effects on the IAT and AMP suggests that ME 
instructions influence actual implicit liking of the stimulus. ME instruction effects on the 
AMP cannot be explained by non-attitudinal factors that influence IAT performance (e.g., 
recoding of IAT categories). In line with the idea that ME instruction effects on both IAT and 
AMP are not entirely the result of controlled, non-automatic processes that involve the 
intentional use of the provided information, additional t-test analyses (reported in Electronic 
Supplementary Material 1) indicated that ME instructions produced larger changes in implicit 
evaluations (measured with the IAT and AMP) than explicit evaluations. This accords with 
other findings that instructions about stimulus events can have a direct influence on implicit 
evaluation (i.e., unmediated by changes in explicit evaluation; Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, 
                                                 
2
 To further investigate ME instruction effects on EPT performance, we also performed analyses with item-based 
linear mixed effects models (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). This approach allowed us to investigate 
participants’ raw reaction times (RTs) rather than an index of their performance as combined in one (unreliable) 
EPT score and to control for possible effects of counterbalancing factors such as the target words or prime words 
that were used. This approach has revealed more robust effects of approach-avoidance instructions in recent 
studies compared to traditional analyses (Van Dessel, Gawronski, Smith, & De Houwer, 2017). Importantly, 
however, the linear mixed effects regression analyses supported the conclusion of the main analyses that EPT 
performance was not influenced by ME instructions. We did not observe any main effects of Prime Type 
(instructed frequent or infrequent word) or interaction effects with Target Type (positive or negative target), χ2s < 
2.59, ps > .10. 
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et al., 2016). Moreover, statistical mediation analyses indicated that changes in explicit 
evaluations did not fully mediate the impact of ME instructions on implicit evaluation. In 
contrast, we observed full mediation of the ME instruction effect on explicit evaluation via 
implicit evaluation (see Electronic Supplementary Material 1) .
3
 
The results of Experiments 4-7 also provided evidence that ME instruction effects 
depend on participants’ memory of the instructions. When participants had accurate memory 
of the instructions, they preferred the instructed frequent word in all experiments (except for 
when evaluations were measured with the EPT). When participants had indiscriminate 
memory of the instructions, we observed a ME instruction effect on implicit and explicit 
measures of evaluation in Experiment 4, but not in any of the other experiments. In contrast, 
participants who had reversed memory of the instructions sometimes preferred the word that 
was instructed to occur infrequently (only when evaluations were registered with explicit 
measures). This contrast effect has been observed also for experience-based ME effects 
(Stafford & Grimes, 2012) and effects of approach-avoidance instructions (Van Dessel, De 
Houwer, & Gast, 2016). Importantly, however, Bayesian factors indicated that the evidence 
for ME instruction effects for participants with reversed and indiscriminate memory was only 
anecdotal, whereas strong evidence was obtained for ME instruction effects for participants 
with accurate memory for the instructions. 
General Discussion 
In seven experiments, we investigated whether ME instructions influence liking. 
Participants received instructions that one non-existing word would occur often in a 
subsequent phase and another non-existing word would occur rarely. After these instructions, 
but before participants actually experienced these regularities, evaluations of the two words 
                                                 
3
 Note that in the current studies the explicit evaluation task consisted of only a single item (which contrasts with 
the multi-trial procedure of implicit measures). This could contribute to the fact that we observed stronger effects 
of ME instructions on implicit than on explicit evaluations. 
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were assessed. Participants exhibited a preference for the word that was instructed to occur 
frequently on implicit measures of evaluation (IAT, pIAT, AMP, but not EPT) and on explicit 
measures of evaluation (explicit liking ratings). Robust ME instruction effects were observed 
only when participants were able to indicate correctly which word would occur more 
frequently.  
Similar to the original demonstrations of instruction-based approach-avoidance and 
EC effects (De Houwer, 2006; Van Dessel et al., 2015), the current demonstration of a ME 
instruction effect is bound to raise a number of questions that will need to be addressed in 
future research. However, we believe that the current results already have a number of 
important theoretical and practical implications. In the remainder of this section, we discuss 
how the current results inform us about the boundary conditions of ME instruction effects and 
the mental processes that underlie ME instruction and ME experience effects. 
Boundary conditions of ME instruction effects 
The current studies provide evidence that ME instructions can produce robust changes 
in implicit and explicit stimulus evaluations. Similar to approach-avoidance instructions (see 
Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, et al., 2016), ME instructions might even produce stronger 
effects on implicit than on explicit measures of evaluation (see Electronic Supplementary 
Material 1). Importantly, however, ME instruction effects were not observed when evaluations 
were registered with an EPT.
 
Though many previous studies have found that effects of 
manipulations on different measures of implicit evaluation do not necessarily converge, it 
often remains unclear why these dissociations arise (see De Houwer, 2003, for a discussion). 
In the current experiments, we found a dissociation between ME instruction effects on EPTs 
and effects on implicit measures that are also latency-based (IAT, pIAT) or priming-based 
(AMP). One possible reason for this dissociation is that the EPT was unable to capture the 
small effect sizes of ME instruction effects due to the lower reliability of the observed EPT 
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scores (see also Wittenbrink, 2007). In line with this idea, correlational analyses revealed only 
small (Experiment 5) or non-significant (Experiments 6) correlations between EPT scores and 
explicit rating scores. Especially for novel stimuli such as unfamiliar non-existing words, 
stronger correlations between implicit and explicit evaluations are typically observed (Nosek, 
2005).  
Another possibility is that EPT procedures specifically hamper the observation of ME 
instruction effects. In line with this hypothesis, it has been observed that other instruction-
based procedures (i.e., evaluative conditioning, approach-avoidance learning) do lead to 
reliable EPT effects (e.g., Van Dessel et al., 2015). In contrast, a recent study in which we 
investigated effects of actual stimulus presentations on stimulus evaluations found a ME 
effect on IAT scores and explicit ratings but not on EPT scores (Van Dessel, Mertens, Smith, 
& De Houwer, 2017).
4
 Thus, whatever the reason for this moderation may be, it might be 
similar for ME instruction and ME experience effects. One possible reason for why reliable 
ME (instruction) effects are not observed on EPT performance is that ME (instructions) might 
increase the salience of the infrequent (instructed) stimulus compared to the frequent 
(instructed) stimulus (because presentation of the infrequent stimulus is more unexpected). 
This could influence EPT performance (e.g., because it draws attention away from evaluative 
stimulus features; see also De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009) and mask 
the influence of participants’ liking of the stimulus on EPT performance (to a larger extent 
than IAT and AMP performance). A second possibility is that participants’ preference for the 
(instructed) frequent word is reduced when participants encounter a number of presentations 
of the frequent and infrequent (instructed) word during the implicit evaluation task. Although 
this actual exposure might have reduced ME (instruction) effects on all implicit measures, it 
                                                 
4
 This study used the same non-words as stimuli, the same procedures for the implicit and explicit evaluation 
tasks, and the same online data-collection procedure as the current study. Similar to the ME instruction effects 
observed here, experience-based ME effects on implicit and explicit evaluations were also small to medium sized 
(IAT: dzs [0.21-0.26]; EPT: dz = 0.09; explicit ratings: dzs [0.05-0.19]). 
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could have influenced EPT performance most strongly. For instance, compared to the EPT, 
the IAT might more easily pick up an initial preference because participants are required to 
link the stimuli with a certain valence at the beginning of the task (see Ebert, Steffens, von 
Stülpnagel, & Jelenec, 2009 for evidence that this can strengthen existing preferences). Note, 
however, that the explicit measures revealed a ME instruction effect despite the fact that the 
explicit measures always followed the implicit measures (which involved actual stimulus 
presentations). This indicates that performance of the implicit evaluation tasks does not totally 
cancel out the effects of ME instructions.  
A third possible reason why we did not observe effects of ME instructions (and ME 
experience) on the EPT is that these learning procedures simply do not produce genuine 
changes in implicit evaluation. In this case, the observed effects on IAT scores might result 
from systematic construct-unrelated variance that is due to participants’ recoding of IAT 
categories (Rothermund et al., 2009). More specifically, in the IAT, participants might 
categorize stimuli on the basis of features other than valence that are shared between two 
categories of stimuli. This recoding might simplify performance in blocks where these stimuli 
have to be categorized with the same key, which can lead to IAT effects (Rothermund & 
Wentura, 2004; Kinoshita & Peek-O’Leary, 2005). In our studies, recoding might occur in 
blocks where the instructed frequent word and positive stimuli are categorized with the same 
key. For instance, participants might categorize all stimuli on the basis of frequency because 
(1) positive words are typically contacted more frequently than negative words in daily life 
and (2) the instructed frequent word is said to occur more frequently than the instructed 
infrequent word. Recoding might also occur on the basis of stimulus salience because (1) 
negative stimuli are typically more salient than positive stimuli and (2) the instructed 
infrequent word might be more salient than the instructed frequent word because its frequent 
presentation in the IAT contrasts with the ME instructions. Such strategic recoding might 
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explain the ME instruction effects on the IAT. Because of the task’s structure, priming-based 
procedures such as the EPT (but also the AMP) are less susceptible to confounding recoding 
processes (Wentura & Degner, 2010; Gawronski & Ye, 2014). Hence, if the effects on the IAT 
reflect recoding rather than genuine changes in implicit liking, then effects should be absent 
on the EPT. 
In the case of the AMP, ME instruction effects might reflect other systematic 
construct-unrelated variance such as variance that is due to strategic responding. It has been 
well established that AMP scores can be controlled intentionally (Teige-Mocigemba et al., 
2016; Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012). In our study, participants might have controlled their 
evaluative responses in the AMP by emitting more positive evaluations of Chinese ideographs 
on trials with the frequent word as prime. It has been argued that EPT performance reflects 
more automatic processes than AMP performance (e.g., because categorization responses are 
emitted to clearly valenced stimuli rather than to ambiguous Chinese ideographs). Note 
however, that there is little evidence to support this claim (see De Houwer et al., 2009, for a 
review). In fact, EPT effects are also known to be susceptible to voluntary control (see Teige-
Mocigemba & Klauer, 2013). Hence, it is always difficult to be absolutely sure that changes 
observed on implicit measures reflect genuine liking rather than strategic responding or other 
construct-unrelated variance, irrespective of the implicit measurement procedure that is used. 
Nonetheless, there is some evidence that supports the idea that ME instructions did 
produce genuine changes in implicit evaluation. First, we found that changes in implicit 
evaluations were not fully mediated by changes in explicit evaluations (in fact, evidence was 
more in line with a reversed mediation model). If controlled responding fully accounts for 
changes in implicit evaluation then we should observe full mediation by changes in explicit 
evaluation because explicit evaluation measures are more vulnerable to intentional control 
(see also Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, et al., 2016). As a counterargument, one might point 
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out that the explicit evaluation measure had less statistical power to capture these (controlled) 
effects because it only consisted of a single item (which contrasts with the multi-trial 
procedure of implicit measures). However, previous studies that used multiple items to 
measure explicit evaluations found high correlations between explicit evaluations measured 
with this item and other items (e.g., Van Dessel et al., 2015). Moreover, prior research showed 
that instruction-based manipulations even produced stronger effects on explicit evaluations 
that only incorporated this item compared to explicit evaluations that incorporated multiple 
items. Second, to examine the contribution of genuine implicit evaluation in the observed IAT 
effects, we applied the ReAL model to the IAT data of Experiment 1. This is a multinomial 
processing tree model that provides separate estimates for the influence of (automatic) 
evaluative processes and recoding processes in IAT performance (Meissner & Rothermund, 
2013). Results provided evidence that evaluative processes significantly contributed to the 
IAT effect after controlling for recoding processes (see Electronic Supplementary Material 3). 
In sum, although it is always difficult to be absolutely sure that changes observed on 
implicit measures reflect genuine changes in liking, we believe that our results provide 
sufficient grounds to support the conclusion that ME instructions influence implicit 
evaluations. To the extent that doubts remain about this conclusion, one should also doubt 
whether ME experience procedures produce genuine changes in (implicit) liking, given that 
both procedures led to similar changes in the various measures that we used. Future studies 
are required to test why ME instruction and ME experience effects are not (easily) registered 
with an EPT. 
Another important observation is that ME instructions produced robust effects only for 
participants with accurate memory. This suggests that participants need to be consciously 
aware of the instructed information (enabling them to correctly report the information) in 
order to exhibit the changes in liking. We note, however, that the current study investigated 
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whether ME instruction effects depend on participants’ memory of which of two stimuli 
would occur most often (as measured with a single question that followed the evaluation 
tasks). It is possible that a third variable determines both ME instruction effects and 
participants’ answer to this question such that more robust ME instruction effects are observed 
when participants have accurate memory. For instance, participants with accurate memory 
may be more attentive or engaged in the experiment and this could moderate both ME 
instruction effects and memory test performance. 
Implications for mental process theories of ME and ME instruction effects 
It is important to note that on a functional level (i.e., defining effects in terms of 
observable regularities in the environment) there is a clear distinction between standard ME 
effects and ME instruction effects. A ME effect is typically defined as a change in liking that 
is due to the frequent exposure to a certain stimulus. In our paradigm, there was no 
manipulation of the exposure frequency of stimuli. A preference for the instructed frequent 
word over the instructed infrequent word emerged even though the actual number of 
exposures to these words was identical. Hence, from this perspective, the results reported in 
this paper do not qualify as ME effects. Nonetheless, we do believe that ME instruction 
effects are relevant not only in their own right but also for the study of ME effects. ME 
(experience) research focuses on the impact of one type of events: the frequency of exposures. 
Because ME instructions provide verbal information about exactly those types of events, they 
can help elucidate how exposure frequency influences liking (see De Houwer & Hughes, 
2016, for a similar argumentation in the context of EC instruction effects and EC). For 
instance, the finding that ME instructions produce changes in stimulus evaluations fits well 
with the idea that ME effects are mediated by conscious propositional beliefs about the 
frequency of occurrence of the stimuli (e.g., Stafford & Grimes, 2012; Wang & Chang, 2004). 
Based on this idea, one would indeed expect that liking changes irrespective of whether 
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beliefs about frequency are formed on the basis of actual stimulus exposures or on the basis of 
instructions. Of course, neither our findings, nor previous evidence in support of belief-based 
models of ME, allow for definite conclusions regarding the mental mechanisms that mediate 
ME. For instance, it is also possible that multiple processes produce ME effects, some of 
which do not require the acquisition of propositional knowledge (e.g., ME effects with 
subliminal stimulus presentations, Monahan, Murphy, & Zajonc, 2000). Importantly, research 
on ME instruction effects can help shed light on these issues, for instance, by examining 
whether actual stimulus exposures add to the effects of mere instructions about stimulus 
exposures (see Raes, De Houwer, De Schryver, Brass, & Kalish, 2014, and Kurdi & Banaji, 
2017, for a similar approach in the context of fear conditioning and EC).  
In the remainder of this section we discuss possible explanations for ME instruction 
effects. A first process that might contribute to ME instruction effects is demand compliance 
(Sawyer, 1975). That is, participants might infer that the experimenter wants them to indicate 
a preference for the instructed frequent word and strategically adjust their responses according 
to this inference. We see three reasons why this explanation is unlikely to provide a full 
account of ME instruction effects. First, unlike what would be expected on the basis of a 
demand compliance account, changes in implicit evaluations were not fully mediated by 
changes in explicit evaluations (see Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, et al., 2016, for similar 
evidence in the context of approach-avoidance instructions). Second, as we described above, 
additional analyses suggest that ME instruction effects involved genuine changes in implicit 
liking (e.g., fitting the ReAL model on IAT data supported the contribution of automatic 
evaluative processes). Third, in a recent follow-up study that examined effects of ME 
instructions on implicit and explicit evaluations (Hughes, Van Dessel, & Smith, 2017), we 
included a question that asked participants on what basis they had emitted their explicit liking 
ratings. Only a small subset of participants (<5%) indicated that they had based their 
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evaluations on what they expected that the experimenter wanted them to do. ME instruction 
effects were observed on implicit and explicit evaluations even when the data of these 
participants were excluded from the analyses. Of course, it is still possible that demand 
compliance contributed to ME instruction effects and participants just did not accurately 
report their demand compliance (e.g., because they believed that not reporting demand 
compliance would please the experimenter). 
Another possible explanation for the ME instruction effect is that, when participants 
acquire knowledge about the frequency of a stimulus, they may elaborate on this information 
and infer that frequent stimuli are positive. People might make this inference because 
frequently occurring stimuli are typically safe and harmless (Zajonc, 2001).
5
 Once this 
proposition is formed, this may influence both explicit and implicit stimulus evaluation (see 
De Houwer, 2014). This propositional explanation of ME (instruction) effects accords with 
recent propositional explanations of EC (De Houwer, 2009b) and approach-avoidance effects 
(Van Dessel, De Houwer, & Gast, 2016).  
A third option is that ME instruction effects (partly) result from processing fluency, or 
the ease with which a stimulus can be processed. Processing fluency is often assumed to play 
an important role in ME experience effects (e.g., Fang, Singh, & Ahluwalia, 2007; Harmon-
Jones & Allen, 2001). From this perspective, repeated exposure to a stimulus can result in 
facilitated processing of this stimulus when re-encountering it (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). This 
may generate a feeling of fluency or ease, which (1) may evoke a positive feeling that can 
transfer to the stimulus (Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998) or (2) can be misattributed to 
liking or to any other stimulus property that a participant is asked to rate (Bornstein & 
                                                 
5
 Note that people do not necessarily make such an inference in a controlled manner. Inferences often occur 
under certain conditions of automaticity (e.g., when the application of the underlying rule is well-practiced, see 
Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). Frequency of occurrence might be used as a heuristic such that, once people 
acquire information about the frequency of a stimulus, they spontaneously use this information for determining 
stimulus valence. 
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D’Agostino, 1992). Evidence for these ideas is provided by studies showing that other 
manipulations that induce a feeling of fluency (e.g., long exposure duration or high stimulus-
background contrast) also produce positive stimulus evaluations (Reber et al., 1998; Reber, 
Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004). One could argue that ME instructions can also influence 
processing fluency. For instance, learning that a new stimulus will occur frequently might 
facilitate processing of this stimulus through mental practice or rehearsal of the frequent 
stimulus (see Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002 for evidence that people engage in mental 
simulation of events that are described in instructions). This might result in more fluent 
processing of the instructed frequent word compared to the instructed infrequent word which 
could produce the changes in liking.  
Another possible explanation is that ME instruction effects are actually specific 
instances of EC. EC refers to a change in liking that is due to the pairing of stimuli (De 
Houwer, 2007). One could argue that within the ME instructions, there is a (one-trial) pairing 
of a neutral stimulus (i.e., “Fevkani” or “Lokanta”) and the word “often” or “rarely”. The 
latter words might qualify as valenced stimuli, as indicated by a pilot study showing that 
participants exhibit more positive implicit evaluations of words related to the concept 
“frequent” than of words related to the concept “infrequent”. 6 Hence, it is at least possible 
that the observed changes in stimulus evaluation resulted from the stimulus pairings within 
the ME instructions (e.g., Field, 2006). Nevertheless, we believe it is overly simplistic to 
assume that instructions have an effect because of their mere spatio-temporal properties. 
Instructions are structured symbolic messages that convey information about the properties of 
stimuli (see De Houwer & Hughes, 2016, for a discussion in the context of EC). It seems 
                                                 
6
 In a short study with 14 participants, we observed that participants had faster reaction times in IAT blocks in 
which they categorized frequent words (i.e. the Dutch words for OFTEN, FREQUENT, MANY, PERSISTENT) 
and positive words with the same response key and infrequent words (i.e. the Dutch words for SOMETIMES, 
RARELY, SCARCE, SPORADIC) and negative words with another response key than in IAT blocks with the 
response key assignment reversed, t(13) = 7.75, p < .001, dz = 2.07. 
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highly probable that an instruction such as “Fevkani will be presented often” has an effect on 
liking not simply because words (e.g., “Fevkani” and “often”) co-occur in the same sentence 
but because the instruction specifies that these words are related in a specific manner (i.e., 
Fevkani will be presented often). In line with this idea, a recent study showed that effects of 
(approach-avoidance) instructions on implicit evaluation were moderated by the relational 
information specified in the instructions (Van Dessel, De Houwer, & Smith, 2017). Future 
research could address to what extent relational information also moderates ME instruction 
effects. 
It is clear from this (non-exhaustive) overview that there are a number of possible 
mental process explanations for ME instruction effects. Whatever the mediating mental 
mechanisms might turn out to be, the observation of a ME instruction effect raises many 
novel questions, including fundamental questions about the unique contribution that actual 
stimulus presentations have on liking. In fact, the mere possibility that ME experience effects 
might in part depend on similar mechanisms as ME instruction effects might stimulate new 
research that is bound to increase our understanding of this important phenomenon. We 
believe that research on the effects of ME instructions can provide a new way to investigate 
the mechanisms underlying ME experience effects while also allowing us to gain a better 
understanding of instruction effects on (implicit) evaluations and evaluative learning in 
general (see Van Dessel, De Houwer, & Smith, 2017, for an example in the context of 
approach-avoidance instruction effects). For instance, testing whether ME instructions can 
produce other effects that are influenced by processing fluency (e.g., enhance attention to the 
infrequent stimulus, see Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007) or whether ME instruction 
effects depend on an EC mechanism might expand our knowledge on the mental processes 
underlying ME effects as well as instruction-based effects.  
Concluding remarks 
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This set of studies provides strong evidence that ME instructions can influence both 
implicit and explicit evaluations and adds to recent work showing that evaluative learning 
effects which were traditionally assumed to rely entirely on automatic processes can also be 
obtained via mere instructions (e.g., EC: De Houwer, 2006; approach-avoidance training 
effects: Van Dessel et al., 2015). There are of course many questions that still need to be 
addressed, most prominently questions about the precise mechanism on which instructed ME 
effects rely and to what extent these mechanisms might also underlie experience-based ME 
effects. Nonetheless, the current studies already contribute substantially to the literature on 
ME and evaluative learning. Not only do they provide the first evidence ever for ME 
instruction effects, they also reveal both the generality (e.g., effects across various measures 
of liking) and boundary conditions of the effect (e.g., the absence of effects on the EPT and 
the impact of memory). Finally, the mere fact that the data raise many new questions is 
perhaps the most important contribution of our work simply because those questions are likely 
to stimulate new research. We therefore hope that the present studies will provide the basis for 
many important future discoveries. 
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Electronic Supplementary Material 
ESM 1. Additional Analyses (ElectronicSupplementaryMaterial1.docx). This document 
reports t-test analyses and mediational analyses for ME instruction effects on implicit and 
explicit evaluation scores and on mean reaction times in implicit evaluation tasks.  
ESM 2. Raw Data (RawData.zip). This zip-file contains raw data files of all the experiments 
reported in this manuscript.  
ESM 3. ReAL Model Analyses (ElectronicSupplementaryMaterial3.docx). This document 
reports analyses with the ReAL Model for IAT scores in Experiment 1.  
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Tables 






Type of categorization  
 
Basis for computation of 
the evaluation score 
IAT: 
Experiments 1,4 
Valenced words + 
evaluation stimuli 






Valenced words + 
evaluation stimuli 
Categorization in 2 categories:  










Chinese ideographs Categorization in 1 category: 
positive/negative 
The number of positive 
and negative responses 
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Table 2. Mean evaluation scores indicating a preference for the frequent instructed words and 
ME instruction effects for participants with accurate memory of the instructions in 
Experiments 1-7. 
Experiment N Mean (SD) Test statistic Effect size d Bayesian t-test 
Experiment 1: 
IAT score 
28  0.23 (0.42) t(27) = 2.84, p = .008  0.54 BF1 = 5.32,  
Substantial (H1) 
Experiment 2: 
pIAT score  
























2149 0.10 (0.98) t(2148) = 4.91, p < .001 0.11 BF1 = 3919.53,  
Strong (H1) 
 
 
